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Abstract 
	  
I explore a unique exogenous instrument to examine how the intra-familial position of women influence 
health outcomes of their children using micro data from Ghana. Using the 2SLS-IV estimation technique, 
I build a model of household bargaining and child health development with perceptions of women 
regarding wife-beating and marital rape in the existence of domestic violence laws in Ghana. Even 
though the initial OLS estimates suggest that women’s participation in decisions regarding purchases of 
household consumption goods help to improve child health outcomes, the IV estimates reveal that the 
presence of endogeneity underestimates the impact of women’s bargaining power on child health 
outcomes. Our choice of instrument is robust to endogeneity, father characteristics and residency 
robustness checks. 
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1.   Introduction 
	  
Mothers play a critical role in fostering early childhood development, strongly influencing children’s 
long-term intellectual and physical health (Smith and Haddad, 2000). However, despite progress in the 
last few decades, women continue to be disadvantaged in economic as well as familial spheres in many 
societies, with obstacles ranging from discrimination in the labor market, access to credit, to inheritance 
and ownership rights in the family (World Bank, 2011). 
The recognition that the unequal distribution of intra-household power may have heterogeneous 
implications  for  parental  investments  in  children  has  ignited  a  growing  interest  in  intra-household 
resource allocation and its implication for developmental outcomes of children. This project revolves 
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around intra-familial position of women in Ghana and its implication for early childhood development 
regarding health. 
A survey of the literature, however, reveals a lack of consensus on the measures of bargaining 
power. In the literature, bargaining power within households has been measured using direct and indirect 
proxies like relative income contribution, educational attainment, and direction of dowry, inheritance and 
ownership rights (e.g. Blumberg, 1988; Anderson  and Eswaran, 2009; Friedemann-Sanchez , 2006).  The 
differences in the measures of women’s bargaining power may be attributed to the diversity in the 
political and social institutions and norms across countries and cultures. 
It is therefore important from a policy point of view to understand the effect of women’s 
bargaining power on early childhood development in each country through the lens of the norms and 
institutions that are peculiar to the culture of that country. 
In this project, I argue that the effect of women’s bargaining power on child health in Ghana is 
mediated through domestic violence laws, which protect women from marital rape and wife beating. The 
choice of domestic violence laws as an instrument for bargaining power will enable me to address any 
endogeneity associated with the direct measure of bargaining power. In the literature, when child 
development  outcomes  are  regressed  on  direct  measures  such  as  women’s  degree  of  control  over 
household decisions, they tend to yield biased and inconsistent Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimates 
due to the endogeneity of the main regressor (Bernal and Keane, 2010). 
Endogeneity may arise because in many societies, women with high quality (healthy and well- 
educated) children tend to gain more respect in the family and community, hence more bargaining power. 
In this case, the reverse causality becomes a threat to consistency. Endogeneity may also arise because in 
the Ghanaian society there is a traditional predilection for male children. As a result, women with male 
children tend to have a lot of respect within the family, obtain more bargaining power and may be able to 
invest more in their children (especially when they are all males). 
To deal with the endogeneity, the 2-Stage Least Squares-Instrumental Variable (2SLS-IV) 
estimation technique is employed. I make use of the existence of domestic violence laws (which is 
captured as women’s attitude toward wife beating for refusing to have sex with the husband) as an 
exogenous instrument for women’s bargaining power.   This instrument is exogenous because in 
jurisdictions like Ghana with judicial systems that protect women’s rights, strong incentives exists for 
women to exercise their rights and participate more actively at all levels of decision making. These laws 
therefore confer bargaining power on women independent of the child. 
The  Domestic  Violence  (DV)  Law,  which  has  been  in  enforcement  since  2007, contains 
provisions that criminalize various acts of violence – physical, economic and psychological abuse, 
intimidation, and harassment (Manuh, 2007). Therefore, there is an indication of low self-esteem or non- 
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empowerment if a woman (even after the passage of this law) believes that a husband is justified in 
beating his wife for refusing sex. Such a perception could act as a barrier for women in accessing 
effective health care for themselves and their children (Ghana Demographic and Health Survey, 2008). 
To understand this whole interaction within a structure, this paper develops a model of household 
bargaining with women’s attitude toward wife beating and marital rape and its implication for child 
health outcomes. The implications of the model are then tested using the 2008 Ghana Demographic and 
Health Surveys (hence GDHS) data.  The choice of Ghana is important because it allows me to explore 
the existence of domestic violence laws as a unique instrumental variable for the first time in the literature. 
It  also  helps  to  provide  robust  empirical  support  for  designing  policy  measures  targeted  at 
bridging gender gaps to affect child development outcomes in Ghana, where women lack influence in 
household decision-making, mainly because of strong patriarchal family structures, even though they 
constitute more than 50% of the population (Baden  et al, 1994) 
This is the first paper to explore domestic violence as an instrumental variable for women’s 
	  
bargaining power whilst testing its implications for child health outcomes using a unique micro data set. 
	  
2. Research Questions 
	  
I have two objectives. First, to identify an exogenous instrument for women’s bargaining power and to 
construct a model with this exogenous instrument to examine the effect of this power on child health 
outcomes using micro-level data from Ghana. 
	  
	  
3. Literature Review 
	  
a. Theoretical Literature 
	  
Several useful models on intra-household resource allocation and bargaining have emerged after a 
substantial body of literature on household bargaining questioned the validity of the traditional unitary 
household model. The unitary model, which treated household as a single unit with common preferences, 
utility, decisions and choices, has been unable to withstand a number of empirical verifications (e.g. 
Schultz, 1990 and Thomas, 1990). 
As a result, there is a growing consensus in the literature that the household behavior cannot be 
modeled as though members of the household had a set of stable preferences. However, though there 
exist several useful alternatives, there is no agreement on the best way to model household behavior. 
Indeed, the literature recognizes that models on household bargaining may differ to reflect the social, 
economic and cultural contexts in which they are used (Chiappori  et al, 2006). In this section, I provide a 
brief overview of some of the existing models proposed to replace the unitary model. 
Collective Model 
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The collective model developed by Chiappori (1988) and restructured by Chiappori et al (2006) 
recognizes  individual  preferences  within  a  household  and  enables  individual  bargaining  power  to 
influence household choices and outcomes.   The model assumes that regardless of how decisions are 
made, outcomes made under these assumptions are always Pareto efficient. The implications of this 
model have been upheld by several empirical studies (e.g. Vermeulen, 2000). 
	  
	  
Non-Cooperative Model 
	  
The non-cooperative model assumes that resources earned by individuals are expended according to 
individual preferences and interests (Ulph, 1988). There exists no pooling of resources as it happens in 
the unitary or cooperative models. There are, however, mixed opinions in the literature on whether 
outcomes made under the assumptions of this model are pareto-efficient (Bourguignon  et al, 1993 and 
Udry, 1996). 
The Cooperative Bargaining Model 
	  
The cooperative bargaining model, also like the collective model, assumes that household bargaining 
outcomes are Pareto-efficient. It, however, establishes more firmly the process by which the pareto- 
efficient outcomes are attained, by assuming the presence of a threat point for each household member 
(Elroy and Horney, 1981 and Manser and Brown, 1980). The threat point is usually an external utility 
option to members of the household. An example of this outcome is “divorce,” where the threat point for 
the household is dissolving the marriage. The efficiency of divorce as a threat point for intra-household 
bargaining, however, remains largely debatable (Lundberg and Pollak, 1993). Per the data used in this 
paper, household decisions are made under the assumptions of the cooperative bargaining model where 
resources are pooled and decisions made reflect individual preferences. The threat point for making 
pareto-efficient decisions lies in the ability of any “abused” member of the household to exploit or use 
domestic violence laws to seek redress. 
b. Empirical Literature 
	  
A number of studies suggest that women’s participation in economic activities is a sustainable way to 
help build human capital in developing countries.  This section surveys the results of extant studies, on 
the subject of intra-household bargaining and child development outcomes. 
Using women’s ethnicity, “arguably,” as an instrument for bargaining power, Lepine and Strobl 
(2013) found that women with bargaining power tend to have children with better nutritional status in 
rural Senegal, whilst Ueyama (2006), with household survey data from rural Malawi, found that 
women’s participation in agriculture has a positive effect on child health, through the added “income 
effect” and “food effect.” Afridi et al (2012), also studying the impact of India’s National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) on children’s educational outcomes via women’s labour force 
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participation, found that greater participation of mothers in the program was associated with better 
educational outcomes of their children. 
Similarly, Smith (2003) also using DHS household surveys for 36 South Asian, Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Latin American and the Caribbean countries, found a strong association between the index of a 
woman’s decision-making power and her child’s nutrition. 
On  his  part,  Kishor  (2000)  used  data  from  Egypt’s  1995  DHS  and  employed  multivariate 
analyses to explore the correlations between women’s empowerment and child health. The study found 
that a woman’s lifetime exposure to employment is significantly correlated with both child survival and 
health. 
	  
Furthermore, studies such as Haddad et al. (1997), Thomas (1997), Quisumbing and Maluccio 
(2000), Doss (2001), Duflo and Udry (2004) and Fantahun et  al (2007) also found a positive relationship 
between women’s empowerment and child development outcomes. 
Even though cultural norms and political institutions strongly influence child outcomes by either 
constraining or improving women’s bargaining positions, there exist major gaps in the literature in 
spelling out the dynamics of these processes (Agarwal, 1997). This is because a majority of the literature 
has tended to focus on more direct and observable measures such as incomes, education, participation in a 
microfinance program or agriculture, etc. For example, in view of the societal preference for male 
children in China, women with first-born sons have been found to have greater bargaining power than 
women with first-born daughters (Li and Wu, 2011). 
This paper thus seeks to fill this gap by investigating how the existence of institutions that protect 
women from domestic violence influence women’s bargaining positions and subsequently how this 
translates into child development outcomes. The implications of this model, I believe, can be replicated in 
other societies with little regard to the cultural or economic setting of the society. 
c. Domestic Violence Laws 
	  
Like many developing societies with strong patriarchal family structures, marriage in Ghana is 
associated w i t h  high social esteem.   For many societies, though the certificate of marriage confers 
certain rights and powers on the partners involved, the degree  of control over decision making 
within the marriage is unequally shared between partners. 
This is because the customary institution, which represents the primary source of legitimacy for 
most marriages in Ghana, does not view women and men as equal partners in marriage. Generally, the 
woman is expected to be subservient and obedient to the husband, and the husband is expected to exercise 
maximum control to keep the house in order. Dery and Diedong (2014) observes that a prime example of 
this is the traditional right of men to discipline their wives through beating. However, this beating should 
be reasonable, such that it does not cause awful physical injuries or death.  Given this cultural foundation, 
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it is not surprising that domestic violence was seen as a normal practice and a means of maintaining order 
in the household. 
To control domestic violence, the government of Ghana in February 2007 passed the Domestic 
Violence (DV) Act 732, which mandates the Domestic Violence and Victims Support Unit (hence 
DOVVSU) to fight domestic violence in all its forms and to set up a victim support fund to advance that 
cause (GDHS, 2008). The passage of the DV Act has since criminalized most acts of violence against 
women and children, and has fundamentally changed the perception of Ghanaian women on domestic 
violence, including making it a crime for a husband to force their wives into having sex without consent. 
This has provided a fundamental pathway to empower women by granting women in the household the 
right to make choices and decisions that best represent their individual interests without fear of abuse 
from their partners. 
Evidence from the literature confirms this assertion. For example, Dery and Diedong (2014), 
using survey data from the Upper West Region of Ghana, found that proximity of a household to the 
police or the DOVVSU is negatively related to the occurrence of violence within that household and that 
physical violence has been on a decrease since the passage of the law. 
On the back of this information, the paper explores domestic violence laws as an exogenous 
instrument, which confers bargaining power on women independent of child outcomes. This helps deal 
sufficiently with any potential endogeneity of the main regressor. 
4. Research Design 
	  
Data and Sampling Techniques 
	  
The study is based on micro level data on Ghana from the 2008 Ghana Demographic and Health Survey 
administered by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The survey, which is 
based on a nationally representative household sample, provides data for 11,778 households. The survey 
employed a two-stage sample design. The first stage involved selecting 412 sample points from an 
updated master sampling frame constructed for the 2000 Ghana Population and Housing Census, using 
systematic sampling with probability proportional to size. The second stage involved systematic 
sampling of 30 of the households listed in each cluster. 
On the data collection, three separate questionnaires were used to collect information from the 
selected sample: namely, the household questionnaire, the women’s questionnaire and the men’s 
questionnaire. This paper uses data from the women’s survey, which contains information on all women 
age 15-49 in half of the sample households. These women were asked questions about themselves and 
their children born between 2003 and 2008 on topics including but not limited to education, media 
exposure, wealth, vaccinations and childhood illnesses, marriage, occupation and husband’s background 
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characteristics, childhood mortality and domestic violence.  For the purpose of this research, I give a brief 
overview of the key variables of interest as presented in the DHS survey in the following section: 
a. Attitude towards Wife Beating and Domestic Violence 
	  
To capture the empowerment effect of gender  equity, the survey collects data on women’s attitude 
toward wife beating and other forms of violence as a proxy for women’s status in the household. 
Respondents  were  asked  whether  a  husband  is  justified  in  beating  his  wife  under  a  series  of 
circumstances: when wife burns the food, when wife argues with him, when wife goes out without telling 
him, when wife neglects the children, and when wife refuses to have sex with him. Per the structure of the 
survey, responses that suggest a justification of wife beating by husbands is seen as a reflection of the 
woman’s low status. Such views show the acceptance of cultural norms that give men the right to use 
force against women (GDHS, 2008). 
b. Household Decision Making Module 
	  
In addition, the survey collected data on direct measures of women’s participation in household decision- 
making. Respondents were asked about who makes the final decisions regarding the following issues: 
their own health care and purchases of daily household consumption goods, etc. Having a final say in the 
decision-making process is the highest degree of autonomy. Women are considered to participate in 
decision making if they make the decision alone or jointly with the husband. Such information provides 
insight into women’s control over their environment and their attitudes toward gender roles, both of 
which are relevant to understanding women’s ability to make independent decisions about their own 
health care and that of their children (GDHS, 2008). 
c. BMI Measurements of Children 
	  
The nutritional status of young children provides a useful gauge for assessing their future health and 
development prospects. However, many under-five children in developing countries are often exposed to 
the risks of childhood illnesses and nutritional deficiencies, which significantly affect their long-term 
health development (GDHS, 2008).  This paper uses the Body Mass Index (BMI) of children as a measure 
of their health status. The BMI, which is measured as weight adjusted for height, is calculated as weight 
in kilograms divided by the square of height in meters. The BMI is important because it reflects both 
current and past nutritional investment in children (GDHS, 2008). Again, the World Health Organization 
(2006) notes that differences in children’s weight and height growth up to their fifth birthday are more 
influenced by nutrition and health care than genetics or ethnicity. Even though genetic factors matter for 
child height, Martorell and Habicht (1986) explain that they only become more critical in adolescent 
years. 
	  
The data used captures the BMI as a Z-score. The BMI Z-score can be understood as the number 
of standard deviations of child’s BMI, from the average BMI of her reference group. The World Health 
The second model, which represents the first stage of the 2SLS-IV estimation, uses the logistic 
	  
regression to estimate the probability that a woman will have bargaining power, given her attitude to wife 
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Organization uses the Multi-Centre Growth Reference, which comprises more than 8,000 children from 
Brazil, Ghana, India, Norway, Oman and the USA, selected because they grew up in an environment that 
is deemed optimal for a child’s growth (WHO, 2006). In this data, the Z-score is mathematically given as, 
Z-score=     Xij           −         µμij, σij  
Where Xij represents the observed height-adjusted weight (BMI) of child of age i and gender j whilst the 
	  
Uij and σij represents the mean and the standard deviations of the reference group with age i and of gender 
group j.  Based on the classifications of the World Health Organization (2006), a child whose BMI is 
below -2 standard deviations of the reference group’s average BMI is considered too thin or underweight 
for her age and gender while a child is said to be overweight if her BMI exceeds +2 standard deviations of 
the reference group’s average BMI. In this paper, we argue that children whose mothers have a major say 
in deciding daily household consumption goods have higher BMI than their reference groups. 
5. Estimation Technique and Methodology 
	  
This paper uses the 2-Stage-Least-Square Instrumental Variable (2SLS-IV) estimation approach. 
Per this technique, I build three different models at different stages of the estimation process. The first 
model, which is the most parsimonious model, estimates the relationship between Child’s BMI Z- score 
captured as HealthStatusij of child i in household j, and the mother’s degree of say in making decisions on 
the daily needs for the home, which is captured as MumPowerij.  This is represented mathematically as: 
HealthStatusij =α0 + α1MumPower ij + α2FamilyWealth ij + α3MumEduc ij+ εij. 
	  
Based on the data, I create a dichotomous variable for the main regressor. That is, in measuring 
women’s bargaining power, a woman who has a major say in deciding daily household consumption 
goods is given a value of 1 whilst women who have no say at all in making purchases for meeting 
household daily needs is given a value of 0. Whilst women who make decisions alone possess absolute 
power in making daily household consumption goods decision, the data does not state specifically what 
degree or proportion of power is exercised by women when they make decisions jointly with the husband. 
For the purpose of this paper, we assume that in making joint decisions, women best represent their 
interests and that of their children. 
I expect mumpower > 0 so that women’s bargaining power is positively related to a child’s BMI 
Z-score. FamilyWealth represents the wealth index of the family. It is a dummy variable for a poor 
household whilst MumEduc captures whether the woman has ever received formal education greater than 
or equal to primary school, and the stochastic term εij,= represents the collective impact of 
unobserved factors on the child’s BMI Z-score. 
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beating for refusing sex. Here, a woman who thinks wife beating is justified assumes a value of 0 whilst a 
woman who think it is not justified assumes a value of 1. Approximately 17% of the population reported 
that it is justifiable for a man to beat his wife for refusing sex. 
Logit (MumPowerij) =ﻻ0 + ﻻ1Dviolenceij ++ ﻻ2MumEduc ij+ ﻻ3MumEmplo ij+ εij. 
	  
Where Dviolence is the domestic violence dummy, MumEduc is an educated mother dummy 
and MumEmploy is the dummy for a working mother. 
Guided by the literature I expect Dviolence >0, that is women who reject domestic violence 
should be associated with bargaining power. MumEduc and MumEmplo control for the impact of the 
woman’s education and participation in economic activity in determining her bargaining power whilst the 
error term, εij , captures the effects of unobserved factors on women’s bargaining power. If the hypothesis 
holds, in the second stage of estimation, I replace MumPower with the predicted value of MumPower in 
the second stage of the regression model. This yields the following model: 
HealthStatusij =a0 + a1PredictedMumPowerij, +𝜎′    + εij.
 
My a priori expectation is that α1>0, and is different from the α1 in the model, which means that women 
	  
with bargaining power have children who are likely to have more weight than their reference group. This 
model also includes a set of controls, as robustness check, primarily, mother’s educational and health 
characteristics, participation in economic activity, access to mass media, household income, demographic 
and father characteristics, which may affect child health through unobserved channels.  The controls are 
briefly outlined in the ensuing section. 
Mother’s Education 
	  
The literature is well replete with evidence on the positive associations between child development and 
maternal education. Education offers an important channel for empowering women with the knowledge, 
skills and self-confidence necessary to participate fully in the development process (UNFPA, 2013). 
Educated  women  are  able  to  make  informed  decisions  on  their  health  and  that  of  their  household 
members. Given the pivotal role maternal education or the lack thereof plays in child health 
development, this paper includes a measure that captures whether the mother in question has ever 
received any form of education. This dummy is constructed from the data by assigning zero to women 
who had no education and 1 to those who have obtained either primary, secondary or tertiary education. 
The model does not include measures that captures the individual effects of the different levels or stages 
of education on child health outcomes. Again, there is a possibility that the impact of maternal education 
is underestimated because educated mothers tend to have more surviving children and thus the sampling 
of living children may result in an over-representation of children of educated mothers (Desai and Alva, 
1998). However, since educated women tend to be associated with lower fertility rates than uneducated 
mothers, we hope that, at best, the two effects compensate each other. 
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Household Wealth Index 
	  
The model also controls for the general effect of the household income level on the probability that the 
child is anemic. This is done by including the wealth index variable, which is a composite measure of a 
household's cumulative living standard, calculated by using easy-to-collect data on a household’s 
ownership of selected assets, access to water and sanitation facilities. This index is important because it 
allows me to tease out the relative impact of household income on child health. In the GDHS data, based 
on the composite score, households are classified under 1 of 5 categories in an ascending scale of income: 
namely, poorest, poorer, middle, richer and richest. Based on this, I create a dummy to capture poverty, 
which assumes a value of 1 if the household is poorer or poorest and 0 if the household is not. 
Father’s Educational Characteristics 
	  
Father’s educational characteristics can influence child’s health through multiple channels. Educated men 
are less likely to subject their wives to domestic violence and hence lead to greater empowerment of 
women, which in turn translates into better child outcomes. Again, educated fathers are on average 
healthier and are more likely to produce and raise healthy children. For instance, Thomas (1994) finds a 
positive association between child health and higher father’s educational attainment. By not controlling 
for father’s education, the impact of mother’s empowerment on child outcomes may be overestimated. It is 
therefore important to tease out the relative impact of father’s education by including a variable that 
captures this measure. In this paper, I control for father’s educational characteristics by including two 
dummies that capture whether the woman’s partner or husband has had any formal education. 
	  
	  
6. Empirical Findings 
	  
OLS Estimates 
	  
Table 1 presents the summary of empirical findings from both the initial OLS and the Instrumental 
Variable estimates. The results suggest that all the predictor variables apart from mother’s age, 
participation in economic activity and household wealth are significant in explaining the variation in 
Child BMI. Specifically, the OLS estimation suggests that women who take part in making decisions 
regarding daily household purchases have children whose Body Mass Index are about 0.15 standard 
deviations (SD) greater than the average BMI of their reference group, and this is significant at about 5%. 
The OLS estimates also show that a unit increase in a mother’s own Body Mass Index (proxy for maternal 
health) is associated with an average of 0.04 standard deviation increase in her child’s BMI whilst 
increases in mother’s years of education and child age also increase child BMI by about 0.19 and 0.09 
standard deviations, respectively. 
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First Stage Logistic Estimation 
	  
The first stage IV estimation results are summarized in Table 2.  The results of the first stage estimation 
are consistent with our priori expectations; women who do not believe that domestic violence is justified 
are likely to have the power to make decisions on daily household purchases, either alone or with the 
husband. The co-efficient of the domestic violence variable is 0.85 in the absence of controls and is 
highly significant, below 1%. After controlling for woman’s education and her participation in economic 
activity in the past year, the co-efficient of the domestic violence variable falls to 0.68 but still 
remains highly significant.   Again, our endogeneity concerns are shown to be consistent with the first 
stage estimation, which shows that women with female children tend to have lower bargaining power 
whilst women with healthy children (higher BMI Z-scores) tend to have more bargaining power. 
Second Stage Estimation 
	  
After replacing mother’s bargaining power with the predicted values of mother’s bargaining power 
(which is domestic violence) from the first stage IV estimation, we find that child Body Mass Index 
increases by about 2.5 SDs for women who have bargaining power and remains highly significant. This is 
about 2.35 SDs higher than the co-efficient of the OLS estimation. In this first model of the second stage 
estimation, we still control for mother’s characteristics of health (BMI), years of education, age, and 
participation in economic activity over the past 12 months. We also include child age and household 
poverty to control for the unobserved influences of these factors on child health. The results suggest that 
an increase in a mother’s BMI is associated with about 0.05 standard deviations increase in child BMI. 
An additional year in a child’s life also leads to about 0.09 SD increase in the child’s BMI. These findings 
are all consistent with the literature.  Mother’s participation in economic activity is surprisingly found to 
be negatively related to child health outcome and is statistically significant. Whilst we cannot say much 
about causality, we assume that happens if women’s participation in economic activity keeps them away 
from children to the extent that it becomes detrimental to child health. The results also suggest that an 
increase in a woman’s age is negatively related to the health outcome of her child, and it is statistically 
significant. Even though this result comes as a surprise, it could also reflect the fact that older women are 
less acquainted with the recent domestic violence laws and are more in tune with the dictates of the 
norms and traditions, which limit their participation in household decision making regarding their own 
health and that of their children. Poverty also surprisingly remains insignificant as a determinant of child 
health outcome in both OLS and second stage IV regressions. 
In the second IV model, we control for the unobserved influences of father’s educational 
characteristics (uneducated father) and age, as well as the possible impact of rural residency on child 
health. The results, which are also summarized in Table III, suggest that father’s age, educational 
attainment and rural residency have no significant impact on child health. However, the co-efficient  
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of the previous variables change. This may suggest that, in the presence of an old and uneducated father 
in a rural household, the mother’s bargaining power increases child BMI by 3.08 standard deviation over 
the reference group, which is consistent with the literature. Under these controls, a mother’s age and 
participation in economic activity remain significant and negatively related to her child health whilst 
child age continues to be positive and significant, as well, but with a higher coefficient. 
Hausman Test for Endogeneity 
	  
To test whether the suspected endogenous variable is indeed endogenous and whether our instrumental 
variable is exogenous, we employ the Hausman test for endogeneity. To do this, we run a reduced form 
of the baseline regression with Mother’s Power as dependent variable. This yields the model. 
MumPower= π0 + π1X1 ij+ π2X2ij+ π3X3ij+ π4X4ij+ π5X5ij+ π6X6ij+ π7X7ij+ ε 
	  
Where X1 is the domestic violence dummy, X2 is woman’s education in years, X3 is Woman’s BMI, X4 is 
Child Age, X5 is dummy for whether the woman is working, X6 is the woman’s age in years, and X7 is the 
household wealth dummy, whilst ε is the error term. Since we suspect that the MumPower variable suffers 
endogeneity from unobserved reverse causation and omitted variable bias, we include the residuals from 
the reduced form equation in the structural form regression below, 
HealthStatus= Z0 + Z1X1 ij+ Z2X2ij+ Z3X3ij+ Z4X4ij+ Z5X5ij+ Z6X6ij+ Z7X7ij + Z8εi +µ, where Z1, Z2... Z7 are the 
explanatory variables in the baseline IV regression, while Z8 is the residuals of the reduced form model. 
The model is run on the null hypothesis that the ε is statistically insignificant and Z8 = 0. If the null 
hypothesis holds, then MumPower is exogenous and does not need IV estimation. However, our Hausman 
test results, summarized in Table 3.0 of the Appendix section, shows that the reduced form residuals are 
statistically significant and thus we reject the null hypothesis that the mother power is exogenous. This 
also confirms that domestic violence dummy is an exogenous instrument for the mother’s bargaining 
power variable. 
Conclusions 
	  
This paper set off to investigate the impact of women’s bargaining power on child health outcomes. To 
achieve this, we build a model of intrahousehold bargaining with perceptions of women regarding 
domestic violence and marital rape, and its implications for child health outcomes using the 2-SLS 
Instrumental Variable technique in order to circumvent endogeneity resulting from omitted variable bias 
and unobserved reverse causality between the dependent variable and main regressor.  Our Hausman test 
for endogeneity confirmed this as an exogenous instrument and the IV estimates showed that the impact of 
women’s bargaining power on child health is underestimated by the biases in the OLS estimation. We 
also found consistent with the literature that the years of education obtained by a woman and her health 
status directly mattered for the health of her child. Whilst father’s illiteracy and rural residency and 
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poverty in the household do not matter directly for child health, per our sample, we find that the impact of 
	  
women’s bargaining power on child health tend to increase in households where the father has no 
education. 
	  
This paper provides strong empirical evidence for women empowerment in order to drive 
investments in child health, especially in countries where strong patriarchal family structures prevent the 
effective participation of women in the household decision-making process. The paper shows that a 
simple, well-carved legislation that protect women from domestic violence and abuse could tremendously 
improve women’s bargaining positions and allow them to independently make decisions that are in the 
best interest of themselves and their children. 
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APPENDIX	  
	  
	  
	  
Table	  1.0	  Results	  of	  OLS	  and	  IV	  Estimations	  
Child	  BMI	   OLS	  Estimates	   2SLS-­‐	  Model	  1	  
	  
Instrument	  =	  Domestic	  Violence	  
2SLS-­‐Model	  2	  
Mother’s	  Power	   0.148**	   [0.076]	   2.528***	   [1.231]	   3.080*	   [1.177]	  
Mother’s	  BMI	   0.037***	   [0.008]	   0.046***	   [0.011]	   0.051***	   [0.014]	  
Mother’s	  Education	   0.185***	   [0.073]	   0.143	   [0.095]	   0.134	   [0.116]	  
Mother’s	  Age	   -­‐0.004	   [0.005]	   -­‐0.022**	   [0.012]	   -­‐0.036**	  	  	  [0.016]	  
Mother	  Working	   -­‐0.068	   [0.115]	   -­‐0.643**	   [0.331]	   -­‐0.778*	   [0.448]	  
Child	  Age	   0.094***	   [0.025]	   0.091**	   [0.032]	   0.098***	   [0.037]	  
Household	  Wealth	  (if	  Poor)	   -­‐0.060	   [0.074]	   0.127	   [0.397]	   0.036	   [0.154]	  
Non-­‐Educated	  Father	   	   	   -­‐0.098	   [0.122]	  
Father’s	  Age	   	   	   0.009	   [0.007]	  
Residence	  (if	  Rural)	   	   	   0.170	   [0.139]	  
Observations	   1563	   1563	   1471	  
R-­‐Squared	   0.04	   …	   …	  
F-­‐Stat	  /Wald	  Chi2	   9.29***	   42.13***	   39.63***	  
***	  Significant	  at	  1%	   **	  Significant	  at	  5%	   *Significant	  at	  10%	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
. 
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Table	  2.0	  Results	  of	  First	  Stage	  Logistic	  IV	  Regression	  
Woman’s	  Power	   Co-­‐efficient	   P-­‐Value	   Std.	  Error	  
Domestic	  Violence	  (No	  Controls)	   0.085***	   0.000	   0.019	  
Domestic	  Violence	  (With	  Controls)	   0.068**	   0.002	   0.027	  
Woman’s	  Years	  of	  Education	   0.032	   0.147	   0.022	  
Woman	  Working	   0.235***	   0.000	   0.038	  
Woman’s	  Age	   0.007***	   0.000	   0.001	  
Child	  Gender	  (if	  Female)	   -­‐0.05**	   0.025	   0.021	  
Child	  BMI	   0.84**	   0.087	   0.008	  
	  
	  
Table	  3.0	  Hausman	  Test	  for	  Endogeneity	  
Reduced	  Form	  Model	  (Dependent	  =Mother’s	  Power)	   Structural	  Equation	  (Dependent=	  Child	  Health)	  
Variables	   Co-­‐Efficient	  	  [P-­‐Value]	   Variables	   Co-­‐Efficient	  	  [P-­‐Value]	  
Domestic	  Violence1	   .361	  [0.004]**	   Mother’s	  Power	   1.553[0.009]**	  
Woman’s	  Years	  of	  Education	   0.543[0.642]	   Woman’s	  Years	  of	  Education	   0.171[0.019]**	  
Woman’s	  BMI	   -­‐0.013[258]	   Woman’s	  BMI	   0.039[0.000]***	  
Child	  Age	   0.021[0.147]	   Child	  Age	   0.086[0.001]***	  
Woman	  Working	   1.241[0.000]***	   Woman	  Working	   -­‐0.438[0.023]**	  
Woman’s	  Age	   0.037[0.000]***	   Woman’s	  Age	   -­‐0.012[0.046]**	  
Household	  Wealth	   -­‐.309[0.009]**	   Household	  Wealth	   0.027[0.740]	  
***Significant	  at	  1%,	  **Significant	  at	  5%	   and	  *	  at	  10%	   Reduced	  Form	  Residuals2	   -­‐0.584[0.017]**	  
1	  Domestic	  Violence	  is	  statistically	  significant	   2Residuals	  are	  statistically	  significant	  
HO	  =	  Residual=	  0	  	  i.e.	  Mother	  Power	  is	  exogenous	   Since	  The	  Residuals	  in	  the	  Structural	  Equation	  is	  
	  
statistically	  significant	  at	  5%	  we	  H1 = Residual ≠ 0, i.e. Mother Power is endogenous 
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Table	  4	  .0	  Summary	  Statistics	  
Variable	   Sample	  Size	   Mean	   Std.	  Dev.	   Min	   Max	  
Child	  BMI	  Z-­‐score	   1759	   -­‐0.54	   1.27	   -­‐3.94	   5.89	  
Child	  Gender	  Dummy	  (2	  if	  female,	  1	  if	  male)	   3299	   1.48	   0.50	   1	   2	  
Child	  Age	  in	  Years	   3128	   4.39	   5.08	   0	   5	  
Woman’s	  Age	   4916	   28.99	   9.70	   15	   49	  
Mother	  Power	  Dummy	   2948	   0.78	   0.41	   0	   1	  
Woman’s	  BMI	   4814	   23.42	   4.69	   12.18	   57.61	  
Woman’s	  Educated	  Dummy	  (1	  if	  Yes	  ,	  0	  if	  No)	   4916	   0.75	   0.44	   0	   1	  
Woman	  Working	  Dummy	  (=1	  if	  yes,	  0	  if	  No)	   4916	   0.78	   0.42	   0	   1	  
Domestic	  Violence	  (Dummy)	   4916	   0.83	   0.38	   0	   1	  
Father’s	  Education	  Dummy	  (1	  if	  not	  educated,	  0	  if	  yes)	   4916	   0.83	   0.38	   0	   1	  
Father’s	  Age	  in	  Years	   2902	   40.23	   11.12	   18	   85	  
Household	  Wealth	  Status	  (1	  if	  poor,	  0	   if	  not-­‐)	   4916	   0.409	   0.49	   0	   1	  
Residence	  Dummy	  (1	  if	  Rural,	  0	  if	  Urban)	   4916	   1.56	   0.50	   0	   1	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Annotated	  	  	  	  Bibliography-­‐	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  Within	   and	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   the	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   Feminist	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  3(1),	  1-­‐51.	  
	  
This	   paper	   spells	   out	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   complexities	   of	   gender	   relations	   and	   their	   importance	   in	  
determining	  the	  outcomes	  of	  intra-­‐household	  dynamics.	  It	  also	  extends	  the	  bargaining	  approach	  beyond	  
the	   household	   to	   the	   interlinked	   arenas	   of	   the	   market,	   the	   community	   and	   the	   State.	   This	   was	   very	  
helpful	   in	   helping	   me	   understand	   how	   state	   policies	   could	   disrupt	   gender	   relations.	   It	   was	   helpful	   in	  
determining	  	   which	  	   variables	  	   entered	  	   my	  	   model	  	   and	  	   also	  	   shaped	  	   my	  	   hypothesis	  	   regarding	  	   the	  
relationship	  between	  women’s	  bargaining	  power	  and	  domestic	  violence	  laws.	  
	  
1.	  	  	   Anderson,	  	  S.,	  	  &	  	  Eswaran,	  	  M.	  	  (2009).	  	  What	  	  determines	  	  female	  	  autonomy?	  	  Evidence	  	  from	  
	  
Bangladesh.	  Journal	  of	  Development	  Economics,	  90(2),	  179-­‐191.	  
	  
This	  paper	  examined	  the	  determinants	  of	  female	  autonomy	  within	  households	   in	  a	  developing	  country.	  
They	  	  found	  	  that	  	  earned	  	  income	  	  could	  	  be	  	  more	  	  important	  	  than	  	  unearned	  	  income	  	  in	  	  empowering	  
women.	  This	  paper	  also	  showed	  me	  how	  non-­‐market	  factors	  like	  laws	  can	  empower	  women.	  In	  fact,	  it	  is	  
the	  primary	  reason	  for	  which	  domestic	  violence	  was	  used	  in	  my	  model.	  
	  
2.	  	  	   Afridi,	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  Mukhopadhyay,	  A.,	  &	  Sahoo,	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   (2016).	  Female	   labour	   force	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  and	  child	  
education	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  India:	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  effect	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  the	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  employment	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  scheme.	  IZA	  Journal	  
of	  Labor	  &	  Development,	  Forthcoming	  2016	  
This	   paper	   studied	   the	   imapct	   of	   India’s	   National	   Rural	   Employment	   Guarantee	   Scheme	   on	   children’s	  
educational	  attainment	  via	  women’s	  increased	  access	  to	  labour-­‐market	  opportunities.	  Using	  child-­‐level	  
panel	  data,	  they	  find	  that	  a	  rise	  in	  the	  mother’s	  share	  of	  parental	  NREGS	  workdays	  increases	  the	  school	  
attendance	   and	   grade	   attainment	   of	   her	   children,	   particularly	   girls.	   This	   was	   particularly	   important	   in	  
helping	  	  me	  	   identify	  	   the	  	   theoretical	  	   channels	  	   via	  	  which	  	  mother’s	  	   bargaining	  	   power	  	   affects	  	   child	  
outcomes.	  
3.	  	  	  Dery,	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  &	  Diedong,	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  L.	  Domestic	  Violence	  against	  Women	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  Ghana:	  An	  Exploratory	  Study	  in	  
	  
Upper	  West	  Region,	  Ghana.	  International	  Journal	  of	  Humanities	  and	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  Science	  Vol.	  4,	  No.	  
	  
12;	  October	  2014.	  
	  
	  
This	   paper	   was	   conducted	   in	   the	   Upper	   West	   Region	   of	   Ghana	   and	   aimed	   to	   explore	   domestic	  
violence	   from	   the	   perspectives	   of	   adult	   men	   and	   women.	   The	   study	   participants	   were	   selected	  
based	  on	  purposive	   sampling.	  The	  data	  was	  obtained	  through	   in-­‐depth	  semi-­‐structured	   interviews.	  
Participants	   reported	   that	  domestic	   violence	   is	   a	   serious	   issue	   in	   the	   study	   area	   and	  60%	  believed	  
that	   it	   may	   not	   be	   justifiable.	   Eighteen	   participants	   identified	   husbands	   as	   main	   instigators	   of	  
domestic	  violence.	  Participants	  thought	  that	  violence	  could	  have	  far-­‐reaching	  effects.	  The	  importance	  
of	   this	  paper	   for	  my	  research	  cannot	  be	  overemphasized.	   It	   formed	  the	  very	  basis	  of	  my	  argument	  
that	   the	   Domestic	   Violence	   Law	   passed	   in	   Ghana,	   indeed	   affected	   women’s	   perception	   of	   wife-­‐	  
beating.	  
	  
4.	  	  	   Desai,	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   (1998).	   Maternal	   education	   and	   child	   health:	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   causal	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  35(1),	  71-­‐81.	  
	  
Using	   data	   from	   the	   first	   round	   of	   Demographic	   and	   Health	   Surveys	   for	   22	   developing	   countries,	  
they	  examined	  the	  effect	  of	  maternal	  education	  on	  three	  markers	  of	  child	  health:	   infant	  mortality,	  
children’s	   height-­‐for-­‐age	   and	   immunization	   status.	   Maternal	   education	   was	   found	   to	   have	  
statistically	  	  	  significant	  	  	  impact	  	  	  on	  	  	  infant	  	  	  mortality	  	  	  and	  	  	  height-­‐forage	  	  	  as	  	  	  well	  	  	  as	  	  	  children’s	  
immunization	  status	   in	  about	  one-­‐half	  of	   the	  countries	  even	  after	   individual-­‐level	  and	  community-­‐	  
level	  controls	  are	  introduced.	  This	  material	  formed	  my	  basis	  for	  including	  maternal	  education	  in	  my	  
model.	  I	  found	  similar	  results.	  
	  
5.	  	  	   Duflo,	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  Udry,	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They	   study	   resource	   allocation	  within	   households	   in	   Côte	   d'Ivoire.	   In	   Côte	   d'Ivoire,	   as	   in	  much	   of	  
Africa,	   husbands	   and	  wives	   farm	   separate	  plots,	   and	   there	   is	   some	   specialization	  by	   gender	   in	   the	  
crops	  that	  are	  grown.	  These	  different	  crops	  are	  differentially	  sensitive	  to	  particular	  kinds	  of	  rainfall	  
shocks.	  They	   found	  that	  conditional	  on	  overall	   levels	  of	  expenditure,	   the	  composition	  of	  household	  
expenditure	  is	  sensitive	  to	  the	  gender	  of	  the	  recipient	  of	  a	  rainfall	  shock.	  For	  example,	  rainfall	  shocks	  
associated	  with	   high	   yields	   of	  women's	   crops	   shift	   expenditures	   toward	   food.	   Strong	   social	   norms	  
constrain	  the	  use	  of	  profits	  from	  yam	  cultivation,	  which	  is	  carried	  out	  almost	  exclusively	  by	  men.	  In	  
line	   with	   these	   norms,	   they	   found	   that	   rainfall-­‐induced	   fluctuations	   in	   income	   from	   yams	   are	  
transmitted	   to	   expenditures	   on	   education	   and	   food,	   not	   to	   expenditures	   on	   private	   goods	   (like	  
alcohol	  and	  tobacco).	  These	  ideas	  were	  helpful	  in	  shaping	  my	  thoughts	  about	  a	  possible	  instrument	  
for	  my	   paper.	   A	   good	   instrument	   should	   be	   correlated	   with	   the	   explanatory	   variable	   but	   not	   the	  
dependent	  variable.	  And	  this	  is	  what	  Duflo	  et	  al	  demonstrated.	  
	  
6.	  	  	   Fantahun,	  M.,	  Berhane,	  Y.,	  Wall,	  S.,	  Byass,	  P.,	  &	  Högberg,	  U.	  (2007).	  Women's	  involvement	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  Acta	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They	   found	   that	   combined	  efforts	   to	   improve	  women's	   involvement	   in	  household	  decision	  making,	  
social	  capital	  and	  immunization	  may	  decrease	  the	  high	  child	  mortality	  in	  this	  setting,	  where	  the	  level	  
of	  poverty	  is	  high	  and	  no	  appreciable	  trend	  in	  child	  mortality	  decline	  has	  been	  noted	  over	  the	  years.	  
This	  was	  very	  fundamental	  in	  providing	  theoretical	  support	  for	  the	  policy	  recommendations	  made	  in	  
my	  paper	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This	  paper	  provided	  me	  with	  an	   insightful	  revelation	  of	  how	  empowering	  women	  can	  both	  directly	  and	  
indirectly	   improve	   child	   health	   outcomes.	   These	   were	   the	   basic	   foundations	   on	   which	  my	   theoretical	  
models	   of	   household	   bargaining	   and	   child	   health	   were	   built.	  To	   spice	   it	   up,	   it	   used	  a	   similar	   dataset	  
from	  an	  African	  country,	  making	  it	  easier	  to	  replicate	   and	  extend	  the	  arguments	  to	  my	  case.	  
	  
8.	  	  	   Lépine,	  A.,	  &	  Strobl,	  E.	   (2013).	  The	  effect	  of	  women’s	  bargaining	  power	  on	  child	  nutrition	   in	  
rural	  Senegal.	  World	  Development,	  45,	  17-­‐30.	  
This	   study	   examined	   how	   women’s	   bargaining	   power	   affects	   child	   nutritional	   status	   using	   data	   from	  
rural	  Senegal.	  In	  order	  to	  correct	  for	  the	  potential	  endogeneity	  of	  women’s	  bargaining	  power	  they	  used	  
information	  on	  a	  mother’s	  ethnicity	   relative	   to	   that	  of	   the	   community	  in	  which	   she	   resides	   in	  order	   to	  
construct	   an	   arguably	   exogenous	   exclusion	   restriction.	  While	   standard	  OLS	   estimates	   suggest	   that	   if	   a	  
mother	   has	   more	   	   bargaining	   power,	   her	   children	   will	   have	   a	   better	   nutritional	   status,	   their	  	  
“instrumental	  variable”	  estimates	   indicate	  that	  the	  true	   impact	   is	  underestimated	  if	  the	  endogeneity	  of	  
bargaining	  power	  is	  not	  taken	  into	  account.	  This	  paper	  helped	  me	  address	  the	  endogenous	  nature	  of	  the	  
relationship	  I	  was	  trying	  to	  model	  and	  helped	  me	  to	  address	  these	  endogeneity	  problems	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They	  argued	  that	  having	  a	  male	  child	   in	  China	  was	  associated	  with	  higher	  bargaining	  power	  for	  women	  
due	  to	  the	  one-­‐child	  policy.	  Their	  argument	  was	  extended	  to	  my	  paper	  in	  making	  a	  case	  for	  endogeneity.	  
Specifically,	   I	   also	   found,	   consistent	   with	   the	   norms	   in	   Ghana,	   that	   women	   who	   did	   not	   have	   male	  
children	  or	  had	  female	  children	  were	  less	  likely	  to	  have	  bargaining	  power.	  
	  
11	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This	  paper	  empirically	  investigated	  how	  mother’s	  bargaining	  power	  influences	  children’s	  health	  
in	   rural	  Malawi,	   by	   the	  distinction	  among	   three	  mechanisms	  through	  which	  women’s	   roles	   in	  
agriculture	  could	  improve	  health	  outcomes	  of	  the	  children,	  (1)	  the	  “pure	  bargaining	  effect,”	  (2)	  
the	  “pure	  food	  security	  effect,”	  and	  (3)	  the	  “bargaining	  effect	  through	  household	  food	  security.”	  
The	   results	   suggest	   that	   women’s	   contribution	   to	   food	   production	   has	   a	   positive	  effect	  on	  
child	  health	  through	  enhancing	  women’s	  bargaining	  power	  within	  a	  household.	  In	  particular,	  an	  
increase	   in	   women’s	   bargaining	   power	   leads	   to	   an	   improvement	   on	   girls’	   health	   condition	  
relative	  to	  boys’	  health,	  similar	  to	  the	  evidence	  from	  existing	  studies.	  This	  literature	  was	   highly	  
relevant	   to	   my	   paper.	   It	   formed	   part	   of	   the	   huge	   body	   of	   literature	   that	   lends	  empirical	  
credence	  to	  my	  paper’s	  findings.	  
12	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New	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  D.C.	  
	  
The	   paper	   reviewed	   recent	   theory	   and	   empirical	   evidence	   testing	   unitary	   versus	   collective	  
models	  of	  the	  household.	  Using	  new	  household	  data	  sets	  from	  Bangladesh,	  Indonesia,	  Ethiopia,	  
and	  South	  Africa,	  they	  present	  measures	  of	   individual	  characteristics	  that	  are	  highly	  correlated	  
with	  bargaining	  power,	  namely	  human	  capital	  and	   individually-­‐controlled	  assets,	  evaluated	  at	  
the	  	  time	  	  of	  	  marriage.	  	  In	  	  all	  	  country	  	  case	  	  studies	  	  they	  	  rejected	  	  the	  	  unitary	  	  model	  	  as	  	  a	  
description	   of	   household	   behavior,	   but	   to	   different	   degrees.	   Results	   suggest	   that	   assets	  
controlled	  by	  women	  have	  a	   positive	  and	   significant	   effect	  on	   expenditure	  allocations	   toward	  
the	   next	   generation,	   such	   as	   education	   and	   children's	   clothing.	   Similarly,	   I	   also	   examined	  
individual-­‐level	   education	   outcomes	   and	   find	   that	   parents	   do	   not	   have	   identical	   preferences	  
toward	   sons	   and	   daughters	   within	   or	   across	   countries.	   This	   paper	   was	   of	   two	   broad	  
significances.	  It	  	  thus	  	  provided	  	  empirical	  	  support	  	  to	  	  my	  	  argument	  	  that	  	  households	  	  do	  	  not	  	  
make	  	   joint	  decisions.	   It	   is	  on	   this	  basis	   that	   I	  segregated	  household	  bargaining	  outcomes	   into	  
two:	   father	   alone	   or	   mother	   alone.	   It	   also	   provided	   theoretical	   support	   for	   my	   women	  
empowerment	  argument.	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On the first day of my ECN 5403, Research Methods in Economics class, my professor told me that only a 
research paper was required for the class; no midterm exam, no finals. Such was how vital the research 
paper was. As usual with research, deciding on a unique topic was a difficult challenge. To help me, Dr. 
Upadhyay taught me how to utilize EIU’s The Keep Online Repository to see past student research works 
as a guide for my paper. The diversity in the research articles available in The Keep was instrumental in 
producing a paper that would be accepted for a fully funded trip to Finland this summer for presentation at 
the United Nations University Development Conference on Human Capital and Growth. 
	  
Specifically, the paper ‘’ A Retrospective Study of the Link between Maternal Social Anxiety and College- 
Student Social Anxiety: Mediating the Role of Maternal Cognitions & Behaviors” by Kyung Won Kim, a 
2014 psychology graduate gave me an idea of what I could do. But since the paper was written in the 
context of psychology and did not have much of an econometric foundation, replicating the study in 
economics was nothing less than a tough challenge. 
	  
However, in the weeks that followed, with the help of the Booth Library Reference Desk, I found books 
on maternal and child outcomes as well as domestic violence and women empowerment. With the ideas 
obtained, I decided to investigate the impact of domestic violence and women empowerment on child 
health, guided by the idea of Won Kim which I found in The Keep. It is the novelty of this idea from 
psychology and the use of domestic violence laws as an instrumental variable for the first time in the 
economics literature that made my paper unique. In the process of writing the literature review, however, 
accessing literature for my paper became a difficult task, as most of the online publishers like Elsevier 
required me to purchase the articles. My mentor then suggested using the search button on the Booth 
Library website, which allowed me free access to a lot of articles, through the JSTOR, LEXIS-NEXIS 
digital libraries and the interlibrary loan facility free of charge. Based on the articles I retrieved through 
Booth Library, 12 of which I cited in my paper, I built my model and tested the implications of my model 
using survey data on 4,916 households in Ghana from the USAID Demographic and Health Surveys. 
Thanks to Booth Library, the paper was successfully written and has since being accepted for presentation 
at this year’s United Nations University-World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU- 
WIDER) Conference in Finland. It has also been awarded the College of Science Student Investigator 
Award for 2016 and will also be presented at this year’s Midwest Economics Association Conference. 
Thank you, Booth Library! Without you, this wouldn’t have been possible! 
